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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Background 
 
With the technological advancements in global communications, contractual arrangements 
created by electronic transactions are clearly becoming more commonplace.  Electronic contractual 
arrangements have, however, raised complex legal issues unprecedented in the law.  Courts must 
now confront worldwide access to agreements via WebPages, e-mails, and CD-ROMs, and legal 
doctrines must be consistently tested and reapplied to address new forms of contracting stimulated 
by advancing technology.    
Technology’s impact on traditional contract law doctrines is readily apparent in the 
dilemmas generated by recent developments in computer software, hardware, and Internet 
transactions.  In such transactions, sellers have increasingly begun utilizing “clickwrap” 
agreements, whereby standard terms and conditions are displayed on the computer screen when the 
user attempts to access the seller’s services.  In a clickwrap agreement, the seller’s terms typically 
pop up before a purchased software disc can be installed (“CD clickwrap”) or while a service is 
being requested on the Internet.1 The term “clickwrap” evolved from the use of “shrinkwrap” 
agreements, which are agreements wrapped in shrinkwrap cellophane within computer software 
packaging, and that, by their terms, become effective following the expiration of a pre-defined 
 
1 I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. 
DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2331918, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004); Dawn Davidson, Click 
and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound to When They Enter Websites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1181-82; 
(2000); Kaustuv M. Das, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements 
and the “Reasonably Communicated” Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 497 (2002).   
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return period for the software (typically 30 days).2 Because of such evolution, as well as the many 
similarities between shrinkwrap and clickwrap, courts addressing the enforceability of clickwrap 
have relied upon the case law surrounding shrinkwrap cases in formulating their decisions.3
Accordingly, any writing discussing the particulars of clickwrap will be peppered with an 
occasional shrinkwrap case, and this note proves no different.                         
 
B. Focus and Objective 
 
The enforceability of clickwrap terms, which are often not known to the user until after 
payment, has become a subject of much debate in the courts.4 Because many of the clickwrap cases 
have been fact-based decisions with seemingly contradictory conclusions, various scholarly and 
academic writings have pointed out the need for a heightened degree of clarity and certainty 
concerning the enforceability of clickwrap agreements.5 Some scholars contend, for instance, that 
even the federal appellate circuits6 are split on whether clickwrap agreements are enforceable.7
The aim of this note is to provide clarity to the clickwrap debate and to argue that the legal 
reasoning behind the various clickwrap decisions has, in fact, been relatively consistent.  More 
importantly, this note illustrates that clickwrap agreements are a legitimate form of contracting, and 
that objections to clickwrap are substantially no different than objections to most other forms of 
contracts.   
 
2 Mortgage Plus, Inc., 2004 WL 2331918, at *4; Davidson, supra note 1, at 1180-82.   
3 Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 476 (2002). 
4 Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer 
Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309 (2003-2004); James C. Hoye, Note, Click-Do We 
Have a Deal?, 6 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 163, 165 (2001).  
5 William J. Condon, Jr., Comment, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap 
Agreements?, 16 REG. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (2003-2004); Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making 
Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 113 (2003); Das, supra note 1, at 504-05; Hoye, supra note 4, at 
165. 
6 There are currently no Supreme Court decisions related to the enforceability of clickwrap. Condon, supra note 5, at 
446. 
7 Ron Corbett, IP Strategies for Start-Up Ecommerce Companies in the Post-Dot-Bomb Era, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
643, 661-62 & n.136 (2002); Bartow, supra note 5, at 113 & n.343 (2003).  
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In analyzing clickwrap cases, one can easily become entangled in various disputes such as 
the prevailing UCC provisions or whether the UCC applies at all.  This note endeavors to slice 
through such entanglements to four critical issues that lie at the heart of the clickwrap debate: (i) the 
requirement for notice of contractual terms; (ii) the necessary opportunity to review and reject the 
terms; (iii) the impact of adhesion doctrines on standardized contracts; and (iv) the effect of prior 
written agreements on clickwrap.  The first two issues, “notice of terms” and “review and 
rejection”, are, of course, necessary ingredients in establishing a manifestation of contractual 
assent.8 Accordingly, part II and part III of this note are dedicated to questions of whether a 
meeting of the minds can be formulated in a purely electronic agreement.  Specifically, Part II of 
this note will briefly discuss the general legality of electronic transactions and the reason that buyer 
assent to clickwrap remains an issue.  Part III provides an in-depth discussion of mutual assent in 
clickwrap, specifically the above-mentioned requirements of notice and the requisite ability to 
review and reject.  In exploring the issues of notice and the ability to reject, this section will 
necessarily consider the impact of such factors on both on-line as well as CD clickwrap.  Next, Part 
IV will assess the contract of adhesion questions that are inherent in clickwrap agreements, and Part 
V will follow with a discussion concerning the impact on clickwrap of prior written agreements.                            
II. THE VALIDITY OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AND THE REMAINING 
QUESTION OF ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP  
 
A.  UETA and the Enforceability of Electronic Documents.
The enforceability of a written provision in downloadable electronic form, and specifically of 
electronic signatures, has been clearly settled by the passage and adoption of the Uniform Electronic 
 
8 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2004).   
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Transaction Act (“UETA”)9 and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
(“E-Sign Act”).10 The E-Sign Act provides that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such 
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic 
form.11 The UETA, which is of similar purpose as the E-Sign Act, was passed by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July, 1999,12 and as been adopted by all but 
four of the states.13 The UETA reiterates the E-Sign Act by stating a “contract may not be denied 
legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.”14 It is 
of some importance to note that the E-Sign Act preempts state law only in those states that have not 
enacted sections 1-16 of the UETA.15 
Neither the E-Sign Act nor the UETA is intended to displace existing contract law 
doctrines.16 Consequently, both acts leave the determination as to whether mutual assent has 
occurred in an electronic transaction to general contract law.17 Notably, the official comment to the 
UETA cites section 3 of the Restatement (second) of Contracts that an agreement cannot be 
established without a manifestation of mutual assent, and that a determination of such assent is to be 
made in the context of the specific circumstances.18 
9 Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law “Mailbox Rule”, 56 BAYLOR L. REV.
175, 190 (2004); see generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (U.E.T.A.) (1999), available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last visited April 30, 2006).     
10 Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq. (2000)); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 27 n.11 (2d Cir. 2002). 
11 Elec. Signatures in Global & Nat’l Commerce Act § 7001(a).  Specht, 306 F.3d at 27 n.11. 
12 See generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (U.E.T.A.) (1999), available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last visited April 28, 2006); Watnick, supra note 9, at 190. 
13 Only Alaska, Georgia, New York, and Washington have not enacted the UETA.  Global E-Commerce Law, UETA 
State by State Comparison Table, available at http://www.bakernet.com/ecommerce/uetacomp.htm (stating that 
information was last updated June 2, 2004) (last visited April 28, 2006); see also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 43.001 et 
seq. 
14 U.E.T.A. at prefatory note, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited April 30, 2006); Watnick, supra 
note 9, at 190.  
15 Watnick, supra note 9, at 191. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 190-92. 
18 Id. at 190; U.E.T.A. § 2 cmt. 1, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited April 30, 2005). 
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B.  The Impersonal Nature of Clickwrap: a “Meeting of the Minds” in the Absence of 
Communication 
It is with regard to the doctrine of assent that the debate on the enforceability of clickwrap 
has predominately occurred.  The mutuality of assent, or a meeting of the minds, is essential to the 
formation of an enforceable contract.19 Whether it is executed electronically or via a physical 
document, a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement between 
the parties.20 The impersonal nature of clickwrap agreements, however, raises substantive questions 
with regard to contractual assent.  In a clickwrap agreement, the same terms are presented to all 
users, and the parties do not meet face-to-face or personally communicate.21 Considering such an 
impersonal method of contracting, can there be assurances that a meeting of the minds has actually 
occurred?22 To phrase the question more precisely, do clickwrap agreements represent a meeting of 
the minds under traditional contract law?   
 
III. MUTUAL ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP: THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND THE 
RIGHT TO REVIEW AND REJECT 
 
A. The Validity of On-Line Clickwrap: Determining Conspicuous Notice and the Ability to Reject 
 
1. The Requirement for Constructive Notice in On-Line Clickwrap
The seminal case regarding assent in web-based contracts is Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp.23 In Specht, defendant Netscape Communications Corp. (“Netscape”) 
invited users to download free copies of its software program, SmartDownload, which it had made 
available on its website.  By clicking on an icon that indicated their desire to obtain SmartDownload, 
 
19 Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 133 (1879); Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29, 47 (1876); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981).    
20 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2002); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.. 805 
A.2d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 2002).  
21 Wei Wei Jeang & Ronin A. Brooks, Current On-Line Issues, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 615, 623 (2002). 
22 Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 492.   
23 306 F.3d at 17; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 481-82.    
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users were able to download Netscape’s software onto their hard drives.  Netscape argued that by 
accessing SmartDownload, such users had consented to the license terms that Netscape had 
identified on its website.  Netscape did not, however, require users to click an “I agree” icon (or a 
similar form of physical acceptance) prior to accessing SmartDownload.  On the contrary, the only 
reference to Netscape’s license agreement appeared in the text of a link well below the software 
download symbol.  Such text urged users to “please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape 
SmartDownload software license agreement.”24 The text of this link was visible to users only when 
they scrolled down to the bottom of the SmartDownload webpage.  The central issue, according to 
the court, was whether the user plaintiffs had constructive notice of the terms of Netscape’s 
agreement.25 
In light of the features of Netscape’s website and the location of its terms, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Netscape had not provided sufficient notice of its terms to 
demonstrate a user’s manifestation of assent to Netscape’s agreement.26 In formulating its holding 
and analyzing the enforceability of on-line contracts, the court established a two-tier requirement of 
“reasonably conspicuous notice” and “unambiguous manifestation of assent”.27 The court 
maintained that “reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous 
manifestation of assent to those terms . . . are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity 
and credibility.”28 Without such reasonably conspicuous terms, the court declared that electronic 
contracts cannot be analogized to the paper world of arms-length bargaining.29 The principles of 
constructive notice apply “equally to the emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens, 
 
24 Specht, 306 F.3d at 23. 
25 Id., at 27, 31-32.    
26 Id. at 35. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 31-32. 
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hyperlinked pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to ‘Download 
Now!’"30 
The court did acknowledge Netscape’s argument that the position of the computer scroll 
bar could have indicated to users that further information remained below the SmartDownload 
icon.31 The court held, however, that simply because a user may have known additional information 
existed below the icon did not mean that the user should have reasonably concluded that a license 
agreement appeared in such location.32 The court pointed out that there was no reason to assume 
users would scroll down or through computer screens just because they were there.33 A reference to 
the existence of terms on a related or associated screen is not, according to the court, sufficient to 
place a user on constructive notice of such terms.34 The Second Circuit concluded that clicking on 
Netscape’s SmartDownload button could not communicate a user’s assent to Netscape’s agreement 
when the user was not provided conspicuous notice of the terms of such agreement.35 
2.  Requiring the Buyer to Click “I Agree”: Distinguishing Clickwrap from Browsewrap
In establishing its two-tier test, the Second Circuit’s holding in Specht36 effectively 
differentiated between an enforceable clickwrap agreement and what has become commonly known 
as browsewrap.37 Clickwrap is now defined by the courts as an electronic agreement that 
automatically presents contractual terms to a user and requires such user to affirmatively click an “I 
agree” icon prior to the agreement taking effect.38 Browsewrap, conversely, refers to a contractual 
 
30 Id. at 30. 
31 Id. at 31-32.   
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 31. 
34 Id. at 32.   
35 Id. at 29-30. 
36 Id.at 35. 
37 Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 475-76, 482-83. 
38 Specht, 306 F.3d at 22; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476. 
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situation similar to that found in Specht,39 whereby a vendor places its terms somewhere on its 
website without automatically requiring users to accept such terms.40 From a marketing perspective, 
it is not difficult to understand why vendors would want to avoid forcing a user to sort through a 
legal document prior to purchasing their product or service.41 In establishing legal enforceability, 
however, a seller’s use of a browsewrap agreement carries a substantial risk.  In the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Specht, for instance, the court specifically expounded on the fact that no true clickwrap 
agreement accompanied the SmartDownload software.42 Instead of a clickwrap agreement that 
conspicuously presented its terms and required users to affirmatively click their assent, the court 
noted that Netscape’s users were required to browse through the company’s website in order to 
access the accompanying agreement.43 By utilizing a browsewrap format for its agreement, 
Netscape failed to give sufficient notice of the terms of its agreement, and as a result, Netscape’s 
contract was found to be unenforceable.44 
3. Deep Linking into Websites: The Ability to Bypass Terms Vacates a Finding of Assent
The requirement of notice of terms is especially apparent in cases involving “deep linking” 
into websites.45 Deep linking, which involves bypassing a vendor’s home page and linking directly 
into the interior of its website, was the primary issue of concern in Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com.46 In Ticketmaster Corp., the website of plaintiff Ticketmaster Corp. (“Ticketmaster”) 
provided its customers with the ability to purchase tickets to its events.  The home page of 
 
39 Specht, 306 F.3d at 23. 
40 Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476. 
41 David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection in the Digital Age and Related 
Topics, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 588 (2002). 
42 Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25.   
43 Id. at 22-23. 
44 Id. at 35.   
45 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2000 WL 525390, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff'd, 2 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
46 Id. at *1. 
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Ticketmaster’s website also contained a user agreement stipulating the terms and conditions for use 
of its website.   
Defendant Tickets.com also performed consumer ticket services but in a somewhat different 
manner.  Tickets.com supplied an informational service regarding available tickets to specific 
events, and a link was given to customers to access the websites of the related ticket providers.  With 
regard to accessing Ticketmaster’s services, the link provided by Tickets.com transferred the 
customer directly to the interior of the Ticketmaster website, thereby bypassing Ticketmaster’s home 
page and its accompanying agreement.  Ticketmaster brought breach of contract claims against 
Tickets.com on the basis of the terms and conditions on Ticketmaster’s home page.  The pertinent 
terms of the agreement provided that any entity going beyond the home page agreed to the terms and 
conditions therein, including provisions that the information was for personal use only, was not to be 
used for commercial purposes, and that no deep linking was allowed. The court rejected 
Ticketmaster’s claim and specifically contrasted Ticketmaster’s website agreement with that of a 
typical clickwrap agreement.47 The court pointed out that although many websites require the user 
to click on an icon agreeing to specific terms and conditions, Ticketmaster’s site did not.48 Further, 
the court stated that the terms were set forth in a manner that required the customer to scroll through 
the home page just to find and read them.49 More importantly, if a user bypassed the home page, 
Ticketmaster’s terms never appeared, and the court asserted that no individual can reasonably be 
expected to agree to unknown terms.50 The court concluded, not surprisingly, that Ticketmaster 
failed to give conspicuous notice of the terms of the agreement, and without such notice, an 
 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 Id.
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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unambiguous manifestation of assent to such terms could not occur.51 Much like Netscape in 
Specht, Ticketmaster could not verify assent to its agreement because it could not verify that its users 
had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of the agreement’s terms.52 
4.  The Necessary Opportunity to Reject: Invalidating “Assent Now-Terms Later” Contracts
Inherent in the ability to give unambiguous and affirmative assent is also the ability to reject.  
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the lack of ability to reject an agreement served to invalidate the 
plaintiff’s on-line contract.53 The plaintiff, Register.com, provided services through its website to 
search for entities that had registered internet domain names.  Subsequent to each search result, 
Register.com’s terms of use were automatically provided to the user.  The Second Circuit ruled that 
such “assent now-terms later” contracts were not enforceable because it eliminated the user’s 
necessary ability to reject the agreement.54 “A party cannot,” the court declared, “manifest assent to 
the terms and conditions of a contract prior to having an opportunity to review them; a party must 
be given some opportunity to reject or assent.”55 The court noted that Register.com did not utilize a 
standard clickwrap agreement whereby access to its services would be withheld until a party 
affirmatively assented to its terms.56 On the contrary, by the time Register.com had presented its 
terms of agreement, it had already provided its services.57 Under such an agreement, the court 
stated that the user would have no opportunity to reject Register.com’s terms, and “would be bound 
to comply with them irrespective of actual assent.”58 Importantly, the court held that even multiple 
search submissions on Register.com’s website would not necessarily equate with assent to its 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 365 F.3d 393, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2004).   
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 430.   
56 Id. at 429.   
57 Id. at  431.   
58 Id. at  431.   
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terms.59 Although repeated exposure would have put the users on notice that Register.com’s terms 
existed, it is also arguable that each time a user utilized Register.com’s services, the user could 
reject such terms and never manifest assent.60 While Register.com’s automatic presentation of 
terms obviously met the first requirement in Specht61 of conspicuous notice, its on-line contract 
clearly failed the second test of unambiguous manifestation of assent.62 
5. Confirming the Validity of On-Line Clickwrap
When an on-line agreement meets the two-part test of “conspicuous notice” and “explicit 
assent” (to include the ability to reject), the courts have accordingly held such agreements to be 
valid and enforceable.63 By automatically presenting its terms and conditions, an on-line clickwrap 
agreement64 undoubtedly provides the user with conspicuous notice of its terms.  Additionally, a 
manifestation of assent is unambiguous when the user is required to click a link verifying agreement 
following the presentation of such terms.  Also, importantly, the user is provided a full opportunity 
to review and reject such terms prior to receiving the accompanying product or service.   
In Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C, for instance, the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld 
Microsoft’s on-line subscriber agreement that required a user to click “I agree” to an obligatory 
number of terms prior to accessing services.65 The court ruled that such users were “given ample 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
62 Register.com, Inc., 365 F.3d at 431; Specht, 306 F.3d at 35. 
63 Condon, supra note 5, at 454-56; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 486-87. 
64 The phrase “on-line clickwrap agreement” should be differentiated from the previously described browsewrap 
agreements, “assent now-terms-later” contracts, and/or “clickwrap” agreements that permitted deep-linking .  A true on-
clickwrap agreement automatically presents the terms of the contract, cannot be bypassed by “deep-linking” into the 
seller’s website, and forces the user to click an acceptance icon prior to receiving services.  Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25, 
30, 35; Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390 at *3; Register.com, Inc., 365 F.3d at 429-30.  
65 732 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
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opportunity to affirmatively assent to the [agreement] . . . and retained the option of rejecting the 
contract with impunity.”66 
Similarly, in Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals concluded that by clicking an “accept” button after scrolling through the mandatory terms 
of Verizon’s internet subscriber agreement, the subscriber had sufficiently demonstrated assent to 
Verizon’s agreement.67 In establishing its opinion, the court stated decisively that “a contract is no 
less a contract simply because it is done on a computer.”68 
The necessary opportunity to review and reject was also specifically addressed in Moore v. 
Microsoft Corp., when a New York appellate court ruled that Microsoft’s clickwrap agreement was 
a binding contract.69 In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against Microsoft, the court noted that the 
plaintiff was provided the opportunity to read and reject Microsoft’s contract at leisure.70 By 
clicking on the “I agree” icon after such an opportunity, the plaintiff clearly manifested its assent to 
Microsoft’s agreement.71 
The courts in on-line clickwrap cases have, therefore, established two critical factors in 
determining the enforceability of Internet contracts.  First, there must be conspicuous notice of the 
agreement’s terms, and such terms must be presented prior to the user accessing the related product 
or service.  Second, a user’s manifestation of assent must be unambiguous, and such unambiguous 
assent cannot be confirmed without the prior ability to review and reject the terms of the agreement.  
If, however, an affirmative response to both these tests is required to validate on-line agreements, 
how then can CD clickwrap agreements, which are generally not reviewed by the buyer until after 
 
66 Id. at 531. 
67 805 A.2d  1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002). 
68 Id. at 1011. 
69 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).    
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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purchase, be considered a legitimate form of contracting?  If the ability to review and reject prior to 
accessing services is a requirement of an enforceable electronic agreement, is it still possible that 
CD clickwrap could also be held enforceable?  The answer is yes, and the legal reasoning behind 
such holding is the subject of the next section.                     
B.  The Enforceability of CD Clickwrap: Notice on the Outside, Terms on the Inside, 
 and a Right to Return 
 
1. Required Notice of Subsequent Terms and an Ability to Reject by Return
Much like the case law involving on-line agreements, the requirement for notice of terms 
prior to purchase becomes essential in establishing the enforceability of CD clickwrap.  In CD 
clickwrap cases, however, the mandatory notice requirement converts to an obligation for notice 
that additional terms will be incorporated after purchase.72 Similarly, the ability to read and reject 
becomes the ability to return.73 The rationale behind these doctrines is found in the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s decision in ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg,74 the seminal case on CD Clickwrap.75 
In ProCD, Inc.,76 the defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased a CD-Rom directory 
database from the plaintiff, ProCD, Inc. (“ProCD”), and subsequently began utilizing the database 
for commercial purposes. ProCD filed suit against Zeidenberg alleging that Zeidenberg’s 
commercial use of its product violated the associated software license agreement.  ProCD’s license 
accompanied the software both in the form of shrinkwrap as well as a typical clickwrap agreement 
that splashed across Zeidenberg’s computer screen each time the software was used.77 The 
 
72 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
73 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450-53. 
74 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449-53. 
75 I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002); Condon, supra note 5, at 
438; Jeang & Brooks, supra note 20, at 623.   
76 ProCD, Inc. 86 F.3d at 1447. 
77 Although ProCD, Inc. contained the elements of both clickwrap and shrinkwrap, many cases and scholars still refer to 
ProCD, Inc. as a shrinkwrap case.  E.g., I. Lan Sys., Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d at 337; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 478. 
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clickwrap agreement barred a user of ProCD’s software from accessing the database services unless 
such user provided an affirmative assent to the software terms.  Additionally, the outside of each 
box containing the software declared that the product would be subject to the license agreement 
contained within.    
In asserting his case, Zeidenberg argued that a contract was formed with ProCD when he 
purchased the software, and therefore ProCD’s clickwrap agreement constituted additional terms to 
the contract that he had not accepted.  The Seventh Circuit concurred that a contract includes only 
those terms that the parties have affirmatively agreed to, and that a party cannot assent to hidden 
terms.78 The court held, however, that one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed to when he 
purchased the software was the inclusion of ProCD’s license agreement.79 
In substantiating its holding, the court highlighted a number of example transactions 
whereby the exchange of money precedes the communication of detailed terms, such as airline 
transportation, insurance contracts, and tickets to a concert or theatre.80 Simply because it was an 
electronic transaction, the court proclaimed, did not necessarily invalidate a “money now-terms 
later” agreement.81 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that a vendor cannot reasonably be expected to 
print its entire license agreement on the outside of its packages, and to do so would eliminate other 
information that buyers would presumably find more useful.82 The solution, according to the court, 
is for vendors to provide notice that additional terms will accompany the product and to provide a 
reasonable time period to return the accompanying product if such terms are deemed undesirable.83 
“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the 
 
78 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450.   
79 Id.   
80 Id. at 1451.   
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1450-51.   
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terms are unacceptable,” the court declared, “may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers 
and sellers alike.”84 Accordingly, the court maintained that ProCD specifically extended to 
Zeidenberg such opportunity to reject.  “Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, 
learned of the license, and did not reject the goods.”85 The court concluded, therefore, that CD 
clickwrap (and shrinkwrap) agreements such as those utilized by ProCD are “enforceable unless 
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”86 
One year later, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision in ProCD, Inc. when it was faced 
with a shrinkwrap case in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.87 In Hill, a consumer ordered a computer by 
phone from Gateway 2000, Inc. (“Gateway”).  When the computer arrived, it contained a 
shrinkwrap license agreement that governed the terms of purchase unless the computer was returned 
within thirty days.  Although no details of terms were discussed when the consumer placed his 
phone order, the court pointed out that the consumer knew from Gateway’s advertisements that 
additional contractual terms would accompany the purchase.88 The court held that given notice of 
terms, and a chance to inspect both the item and the terms, the consumer had affirmatively assented 
to Gateway’s license agreement when he kept the computer for more than the specified thirty-day 
return period.89 In confirming the ProCD, Inc. doctrine of “notice on the outside, terms on the 
inside, and a right to review and reject,” the Seventh Circuit in Hill established what has become 
known as the “layered contract” approach, whereby the timing of the contract’s execution is 
somewhat indefinite.90 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1453.   
86 Id. at 1449. 
87 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).   
88 Id. at 1150.    
89 Id.   
90 M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000). 
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Nevertheless, in two additional cases involving money now-terms later agreements, the 
courts invalidated the vendor’s shrinkwrap agreements.  Interestingly, the first case was extremely 
similar to Hill and also involved Gateway.   
 
2. Unambiguous Assent: Establishing Proper Notice of Subsequent Terms
In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., the U.S. District Court of Kansas found Gateway’s shrinkwrap 
agreement to be unenforceable because Gateway failed to provide adequate notice that additional 
terms would be incorporated into the purchase.91 As in Hill, Gateway supplied the consumer with a 
computer that contained a shrinkwrap agreement stipulating that additional terms and conditions 
would be automatically incorporated into the purchase following the expiration of a five-day review 
and return period.   
The court held the dispute to be governed by section 2-207 of the UCC,92 which provides 
that any additional terms proposed that are different from those offered and agreed upon constitute 
either an expression of acceptance or merely a written confirmation of agreement.93 By basing its 
decision on section 2-207, the court specifically rejected the reasoning established by the Seventh 
Circuit94 in ProCD, Inc. and Hill.95 The Court declared that in both ProCD, Inc. and Hill, “the 
Seventh Circuit concluded without support that section 2-207 was irrelevant,” and that such 
conclusion was in direct contradiction to the official comment to section 2-207.96 The court 
 
91 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).   
92 Id. at 1339 
93 Id. 
94 The Seventh Circuit held that § 2-207 of the UCC applied only to a traditional “battle-of-the-forms case.  Because the 
dispute in its case involved a consumer transaction with only one form (the seller’s license), the court concluded that § 
2-207 was irrelevant.  Instead, the court based its decision on § 2-204, which states that “a contract for the sale of goods 
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of such a contract.”  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).              
95 Register.com, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339-40. 
96 Id. at 1339. 
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explicitly stated that it was “not persuaded [to] follow the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.”97 
Somewhat ironically, however, the Klocek court did just that, and based its ultimate decision on the 
“notice of subsequent terms” theory established in ProCD, Inc.98 
In holding Gateway’s agreement to be unenforceable, the court stated that there was “no 
evidence that [Gateway] informed the [consumer] of the review and return period as a condition of 
the sales transaction, or that the parties contemplated additional terms to the agreement.”99 The 
court acknowledged that under section 2-207 of the UCC, it was possible to argue that Gateway’s 
shrinkwrap agreement was a conditional expression of acceptance constituting a counter-offer.100 
To constitute a valid counter-offer, however, the court held that Gateway was required to expressly 
make its acceptance conditional on the consumer's assent to the additional or different terms.101 The 
court found that Gateway provided no indication that it was unwilling to proceed without the 
consumer’s agreement to its shrinkwrap.102 The court stated that “it is not unreasonable for a 
vendor to clearly communicate to a buyer at the time of sale . . . the fact that the vendor will 
propose additional terms as a condition of sale.”103 A seller, the court declared, must communicate 
to a purchaser an unwillingness to proceed in the absence of a buyer’s agreement to additional 
terms.104 In the absence of such notice, the mere fact that the consumer kept the product longer than 
Gateway’s stipulated review and return period was not sufficient to establish unambiguous assent to 
Gateway’s terms.105 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1340. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1341.   
103 Id. at 1341, n14.   
104 Id. at 1340.   
105 Id. at 1341.   
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3. The Insufficiency of Notice without the Ability to Reject and Return
Regardless of how conspicuously a seller displays the terms of its CD clickwrap (or 
shrinkwrap) agreement, the contract will not be held enforceable if the buyer was given no 
opportunity to reject the terms of the agreement and return the product.106 The court’s reasoning in 
the following case, Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., emphatically illustrates this 
point.107 
In Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the court both upheld and dismissed two types of shrinkwrap 
agreements that were coupled with identical software and purchased by the same buyer from the 
same company.108 The seller in this case, Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., had shipped the buyer its 
software containing a shrinkwrap license agreement, but had done so without a notice that 
additional terms would be incorporated into the software purchase.  On the initial purchase, the 
seller shipped both a test version of the software as well as a live, functional, version.  The language 
printed on the software package stated that by opening the software, the user would be bound by all 
terms of the license incorporated inside.  Nevertheless, the court upheld the shrinkwrap agreement 
in the initial purchase because the test software module enabled the user to accept or reject the live 
version prior to installing it.109 When the same user made subsequent purchases of the software, 
however, the product did not include any such module that provided the user an opportunity to 
refuse or consent to the license.  The court held the subsequent shrinkwrap license to be invalid 
because it failed to provide the purchaser of the software an opportunity to review and reject the 
software and the terms of purchase.110 The court asserted that the shrinkwrap constituted proposed 
 
106 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 414-15 
(2d Cir. 2002); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763-66 (D. Ariz. 1993).       
107 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 763-66.    
108 Id. at 763-65.   
109 Id. at 764.   
110 Id. at 764-65.   
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modifications to the contract by the seller, and under Section 2-209 of the UCC, assent to such 
proposed contractual modifications must be express.111 
The second software purchase in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. points out the insufficiency of 
mere notice of terms.112 The buyer in this case knew, from the first purchase, that terms would be 
forthcoming on the second shipment.  By stipulating that the terms became effective upon opening 
the software, however, the seller eliminated the buyer’s opportunity to review and reject the license 
agreement.113 As numerous courts have found, CD clickwrap agreements (and shrinkwrap) can 
bind a consumer only when that consumer is given both prior notice that additional terms will be 
incorporated into the agreement, and a right to read and reject such terms if they are deemed 
unacceptable.114 Such right to “read and reject” is imperative to sufficiently show mutual assent.115 
Provided that notice is given, therefore, clicking on an “I agree” icon will be considered explicit 
assent if the user is afforded (i) a chance to inspect both the items and the terms; and (ii) an 
opportunity to reject such terms by returning the product for a full refund.116 
4. Reconciling Disparity in CD Clickwrap
Regardless of whether clickwrap (or shrinkwrap) agreements are reviewed as part of a 
“layered contract” or as proposed modifications or counter-offers under the UCC, the key element is 
explicit assent, and explicit assent cannot be established without the ability to reject.  Although the 
court decisions discussed above may be conflicting in their final holdings, the differences in legal 
reasoning between the courts may not be as wide as it would first appear.  In the final analysis, these 
 
111 Id. at 764.   
112 Id. at 764-65.   
113 Id.
114 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341; I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. 
Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336-37 (D. Mass. 2002); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline 
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312-13 (Wash. 2000).   
115 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451; Klocek v. 
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).   
116 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451; M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., 998 P.2d at 312-13. 
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cases actually are in agreement that a prior contract of some kind was, in fact, formed.  In upholding 
the validity of clickwrap agreements, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that when the buyer purchased the software, one of the terms such buyer agreed to was that the 
purchase contract was subject to the additional terms of the seller’s license agreement.117 The court 
continued by declaring that a buyer cannot agree to hidden terms.118 It can be argued that the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision viewed the original purchase contract as one in which the buyer agreed 
to the review and possible inclusion of the seller’s additional terms.  The court in Klocek,
conversely, found no presence of any agreement that incorporated provisions for review and 
possible inclusion of additional terms.119 Consequently, the Klocek court held the associated 
clickwrap agreement to be unenforceable.120 Most interesting, however, was the decision in 
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. in which the court found one software license to contain the ability to 
reject while another license for the same software did not.121 The court therefore invalidated one 
contract while enforcing the other.122 
5. Clarifying Notice of Subsequent Terms and the Proper Period of Review
The primary variables, it appears, are not the relevant UCC articles or whether a “layered 
contract” exists, but rather, the methodology utilized by the seller in communicating its wish to 
incorporate subsequent terms and the time period given to the consumer to review the terms.  Given 
these variables, two key issues arise: (a) the required clarity of notice in communicating such terms; 
and (b) the length of time a buyer must reasonably be given to review the terms.   
 
117 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450.   
118 Id. 
119 Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-41. 
120 Id. 
121 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763-66 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
122 Id. 
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(a) Clarity of Notice 
In discussing the issue of notice, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held ProCD’s 
clickwrap agreement to be enforceable, in part, because it specifically communicated the 
subsequent inclusion of the seller’s full license agreement.123 One year later, however, in Hill, the 
Seventh Circuit required only a notice that some additional terms would be included.124 
Alternatively, in the Kansas federal district, the court declared that a vendor must clearly 
communicate the inclusion of its standard terms.125 Similarly, in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the 
court proclaimed that a seller must communicate to the buyer the subsequent inclusion of any terms 
it deems essential.126 Although the Seventh Circuit in Hill was somewhat lenient in the notice 
methodology required, counsel should be forewarned that most clickwrap cases have compelled the 
seller to clearly and conspicuously communicate its intent to include subsequent terms.127 
(b) Determining a Reasonable Length of Review 
Much like what constitutes conspicuous notice, the required period of review also seems 
somewhat unclear.  Granted, courts have made it evident that the period for the review of terms 
must be reasonable.128 For instance, in rejecting the seller’s shrinkwrap agreement, the court in 
Klocek noted a critical difference between the thirty-day return period in the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Hill and the five-day return period involved in its case.129 Nevertheless, neither the Hill 
decision nor other judgments have established a minimum requisite time period for a user’s review 
 
123 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450.   
124 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that prior advertisements that included 
certain terms, such as warranties and disclaimers, constituted sufficient notice to a buyer placing a phone order that 
there would be inclusion of subsequent terms). 
125 Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-41 (holding that because seller did not clearly communicate to buyer that the 
contract was subject to additional terms, the contract was unenforceable).  
126 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 765 & n.3 (holding that a shrinkwrap agreement was unenforceable because 
the subsequent inclusion of terms was not made apparent to the buyer at time of acceptance). 
127 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 
17, 30-32 (2d Cir. 2002); Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d  at 1340-41; Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2000 WL 525390, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) aff'd 2 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th Cir. 2001); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 765.  
128 Caspi v. The Microsoft Network L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532-33 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1999).   
129 Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.   
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of enforceable clickwrap terms.130 Considering the current state of clickwrap case law, it is 
doubtful such a review period will be defined by the courts at any time in the near future.  As the 
court in Caspi v. The Microsoft Network L.L.C. pointed out, reasonable notice, to include an 
adequate period to reject, is a question of law for the court to decide.131 Nevertheless, in reviewing 
CD clickwrap (and shrinkwrap) agreements that courts have deemed enforceable, it seems safe to 
assume that courts would consider a thirty-day review period to be reasonable.132 
6. The Ability to Reject and Freedom to Contract
The “ability to reject” requirement, as it relates to clickwrap, results in an additional 
intriguing issue related to the standardized format and lack of negotiation in clickwrap.  A 
contractual process, after all, has its greatest appeal when two parties are allowed to freely negotiate 
their associated benefits from the bargain.133 Such bargaining theoretically leads to a mutual assent 
and a meeting of the minds.134 Clickwrap agreements, however, do not necessarily represent a 
meeting of the minds traditionally present in conventional contracts.135 A clickwrap agreement only 
provides the user with the ability to accept or reject the contract; negotiation, in the traditional 
sense, is generally not possible.   The question that arises, then, is what impact occurs on a 
clickwrap agreement when one party feels it has no choice but to accept the agreement?  Such 
 
130 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450-51; Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532-33.   
131 732 A.2d at 532-33; Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
132 See  e.g. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s 
decision to retain the product beyond the specified 30-day return period constituted acceptance of defendant’s 
agreement). 
133 Vincent M. Roche, “Bashing the Corporate Shield”: The Untenable Evisceration of Freedom of Contract in the 
Corporate Context, 28 J. CORP. L. 289, 292 (2003).   
134 Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. 824, 864 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 
133 (1879); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract With Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 906 (2003); Nicholas S. Shantar, 
Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Damages in Lieu of Dismissal?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2002). 
135 Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 492; Reichman & Franklin, supra note 124, at 906.   
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contracts are typically referred to as contracts of adhesion,136 and the nature of clickwrap 
agreements makes them inherently associated with such a title.137 
IV. CLICKWRAP AS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION: THE BENEFIT OF A 
STANDARDIZED CONTRACT V. UNCONSCIONABLE TERMS  
 
A.  Defining Clickwrap as an Adhesion Contract: Standardized Terms, No Negotiation, and 
Unequal Bargaining Power 
 
A contract of adhesion is generally defined as a standardized contract, imposed by a party of 
superior bargaining strength, that provides the other party only the ability to reject or accept it.138 
Obviously, clickwrap agreements, by definition, fall into such a category.  Clickwrap agreements 
are, after all, typically standardized contracts that are executed with no negotiation between the 
parties.139 As should be expected, however, it would be a mistake to assume that such 
categorization alone invalidates a clickwrap agreement.    
 
B.  Validating Standardized Contracts:  The Requirement of a “Reasonable Expectation” of 
Negotiation 
 
The Supreme Court made it clear in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute that the 
enforceability of a contract is not necessarily tied to negotiated terms.140 In Carnival, the Court 
addressed the enforceability of a standardized form contract set forth on a cruise line ticket.141 A
purchaser of such ticket argued that the terms on the cruise line ticket should not be enforced 
because the terms were not the product of an open negotiation.  The Court held, however, that it 
must be reasonable to expect negotiation, and it would be entirely unreasonable to presume 
 
136 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Lopez, 162 S.W.3d 801, 809 
(Tex. App.-Corpus-Christi 2005, no pet.) 
137 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Condon, supra note 5, at 436. 
138 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Serv. 
Corp. Int’l, 162 S.W.3d at 809; Condon, supra note 5, at 436.   
139 Condon, supra note 5, at  434.   
140 499 U.S. 585, 592-94 (1991). 
141 499 U.S. at 593. 
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negotiations should occur on contracts that are purely routine and nearly identical to every other 
contract a seller has issued.142 The Court continued by asserting “common sense dictates that a 
ticket of this kind will be a form contract, the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that 
an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining power with [the seller].”143 The 
significance of Carnival to clickwrap agreements should not be understated.  ProCD, Inc. and 
numerous other clickwrap cases have cited Carnival when addressing the enforceability of the 
standardized contract format inherent to clickwrap.144 In Carnival, as well as the clickwrap and 
shrinkwrap cases that followed, the courts stressed the pragmatism and possible functional benefits 
that non-negotiated standardized contracts could offer.145 
C.  The Practical Benefit of Standardized Contracts 
 
In ProCD, Inc., the court emphasized that standardized contracts are essential to a system of 
mass production and distribution and are valuable to buyers and sellers alike.146 One cannot, 
according to the court, expect a seller to place its entire agreement on the outside of its 
merchandise.147 By placing notice of terms on the outside, and providing the buyer an opportunity 
to review and reject such terms, the court maintained that scarce resources can then be devoted to an 
entire class of transactions rather than expended in negotiating the details of a single contract.148 
“Adjusting terms in a buyer’s favor,” the court asserted, “might help [that particular buyer], but it 
would lead to a response, such as higher prices, that might make consumers as a whole worse 
 
142 Id. at 592-93.   
143 Id. at 593.     
144 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572; Condon, supra note 5, 
at 434. 
145 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 594; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572; Condon, 
supra note 5, at 434. 
146 86 F.3d at 1451. 
147 Id.
148 Id. 
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off.”149 In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reiterated its holding in ProCD, Inc. 
by stating that “practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms 
with their products."150 The Seventh Circuit’s line of thought was consistent with the reasoning in 
Carnival that buyers purchasing standardized contracts may benefit from reduced pricing resulting 
from minimized negotiation costs.151 
D.  Judicial Scrutiny and the Protection of Competition from Holdings of Unconscionable Terms   
 
Although courts have rejected the notion that the enforceability of a contract is tied to open 
bargaining, courts have also been clear that standardized contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for 
fundamental fairness.152 Generally, contracts that are the result of open negotiations and are 
unaffected by fraud or undue influence are given full effect by the courts.153 Nevertheless, courts 
have placed heightened scrutiny on the terms of standardized form contracts that are offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis by a party of unequally strong bargaining power.154 Courts have also held, 
however, that the availability of alternative sources may defeat the argument that a contract is 
unenforceable on the basis of adhesion.155 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated, 
“competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a [contract’s packaging], is how consumers 
are protected in a market economy.”156 A New York appellate court reiterated the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding and maintained that given “the ability to make the purchase elsewhere and the express 
option to return the goods, the consumer is not in a ‘take it or leave it’ position at all.”157 
149 Id. at 1453.   
150 105 F.3d at 1149. 
151 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 594. 
152 Id. at 595; Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203 (Tex. App-Eastland 2001, pet. denied). 
153 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972). 
154 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595; Barnett, 38 S.W.3d at 203.    
155 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453; Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).   
156 ProCd, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453. 
157 Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 252. 
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If competition assures enforceability, one might assume that a lack of competition would 
invalidate a contract of adhesion such as clickwrap.  To hold an adhesion contract unenforceable, 
however, the most critical factors to be considered are associated with the doctrine of 
unconscionability.158 
E.  Establishing Unconscionable Terms in the Absence of Competition  
 
1. The Requirement to Prove both Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability    
A lack of competition will invalidate a contract only if the contract was both procedurally 
and substantively unconscionable when made.159 A lack of competition with no negotiation 
possibilities, in a typical contract of adhesion such as clickwrap, will meet the criteria for procedural 
unconscionability.160 Moreover, a claim of procedural unconscionability cannot be defeated by just 
any showing of possible competition.161 There must be reasonable competition and an ability to 
secure substantially similar products and/or services as those in question.162 
Even if an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it may nonetheless be enforceable if 
the substantive terms are reasonable.163 A determination of substantive unconscionability requires 
proof of overly harsh or one-sided terms that “shock the conscience”.164 In upholding the validity 
of a forum clause in a clickwrap agreement, for instance, a Texas appellate court held that even in 
cases of monopolies, “it is the unfair use of, not the mere presence of, unequal bargaining power 
that can undermine a contract.”165 Accordingly, invalidating clickwrap on the basis of substantive 
unconscionability requires evidence that an unfair use of superior bargaining power resulted in 
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id.; Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73.   
161 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73.   
162 Id. 
163 Id.; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573-74.   
164 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d  305, 314 (Wash. 
2000).   
165 Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App-Eastland 2001, pet. denied) (emphasis added).   
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contractual conditions so exceedingly calloused as to be unreasonably burdensome to the agreeing 
party.166 
Several courts have held clickwrap terms to be unenforceable on the basis of the 
unconscionability doctrine.167 Nevertheless, such cases serve only to reinforce the validity of 
clickwrap, as it was the terms of the contract, not the clickwrap (or shrinkwrap) agreement itself, 
that were held to be unenforceable.168 
2. Decisions Finding Clickwrap Unconscionable: Demonstrating Substantive Unconscionability 
In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., for instance, the court concluded that Gateway 2000’s 
arbitration clause was unconscionable on the basis of an unreasonable cost to the plaintiff.169 
Gateway 2000’s agreement required that all disputes relating to the agreement be settled by 
arbitration conducted in Chicago, Illinois, by an official arbitrator of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”).  The ICC’s headquarters, however, was located in France, and contact with the 
ICC could be made only through the United States Council for International Business.  
Additionally, the ICC required an advance fee of $4,000 (more than the product in question), of 
which $2,000 was non-refundable.  The consumer was also required to pay all Gateway 2000’s 
legal fees should Gateway 2000 prevail at the arbitration.  The court held that the excessive cost 
factor necessitated by such arbitration provision was unreasonable and served to deter consumers 
from seeking the appropriate dispute resolution process.170 
While the court in Brower held a clickwrap provision to be unenforceable, the court in 
Comb v. PayPal, Inc. held that PayPal’s clickwrap agreement itself was so one-sided that it was 
 
166 Comb, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1172-73, 1176-77; M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., 998 P.2d at 314. 
167 Comb, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1172-77; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. 
168 Comb, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1171-72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72. 
169 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. 
170 Id. at 574. 
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substantively unconscionable.171 Paypal’s clickwrap agreement authorized PayPal to freeze 
customer accounts and retain funds that it alone determined were subject to dispute.  Additionally, 
PayPal utilized such a practice without notice to its customers.  As the court noted, PayPal’s 
customers were allowed to resolve disputes only after PayPal had control over their disputed funds 
for an indefinite period.172 The clickwrap agreement also allowed PayPal to modify or amend the 
agreement without notification and required customers to be bound by any such modification.  
Moreover, PayPal’s arbitration clause prohibited customers from consolidating their claims and, for 
many of the same reasons cited in Brower, was also found to be unreasonably cost-prohibitive.173 
The court found that PayPal had shown no “business realities to justify such one-sidedness.”174 
Consequently, the court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, PayPal’s clickwrap 
agreement was substantively unconscionable and unenforceable.175 
In neither Brower nor Comb, however, did the courts rule that the related agreements were 
unenforceable because of their format.176 On the contrary, both courts held that clickwrap or 
shrinkwrap agreements were generally enforceable as contractual documents.177 In fact, when 
referencing the enforceability of clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements, the Brower court 
specifically cited both Hill and ProCD, Inc., and asserted that the commonality of such agreements 
now enables “the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated merchandise . . . over the phone or 
by mail - and even by computer.”178 
171 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-77.   
172 Id. at 1175.   
173 Id. at 1175-77; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.   
174 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.   
175 Id. at 1177.   
176 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.   
177 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.   
178 Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72; Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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G.  The Lesson in Applying the Unconscionable Doctrine: Clickwrap Plays by the Same Rules as 
any Other Contract 
 
Whether it is an agreement executed on paper, established on the Internet, or by other 
electronic means, the doctrine of adhesion is applied no differently.179 Invalidating a clickwrap 
agreement, as with any other contract, requires not only a showing of procedural unconscionability 
(which clickwrap meets), but also a showing of substantive unconscionability.180 Findings of 
unenforceability, however, have been limited, and courts have noted that the theory of 
unconscionability is not intended as a vortex for elements of fairness embodied by other existing 
law.181 Provided, therefore, that the terms of a clickwrap agreement are reasonable, then the 
conspicuous notice of terms and the ability to review and reject such terms will establish the 
enforceability of clickwrap.182 As the Seventh Circuit has stated, clickwrap agreements “are 
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”183 
Nonetheless, the concept of negotiation raises a final significant question with regard to 
clickwrap agreements, specifically as the concept relates to CD clickwrap.  Because the terms of 
CD clickwrap typically arise subsequent to the parties’ initial transaction, it is entirely possible that 
a negotiated written agreement may exist prior to the appearance of such clickwrap terms.  If such 
agreement exists, it would seem (at least on the surface) that the terms of any subsequent clickwrap 
agreement would be considered merely an attempt to incorporate additional terms, and such terms 
would be of no effect without the party’s explicit assent.  Considering the fact-based analysis of 
clickwrap case law, however, such circumstances require further exploration.             
 
179 See Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-73; Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 
S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App-Eastland 2001, pet. denied). 
180 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72; Barnett, 38 S.W.3d at 204; Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573-74. 
181 M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline SoftwareCorp., 998 P.2d 305, 316 (Wash. 2000); see Condon, supra note 5, 
at 455.   
182 Id. at 313-14, 316; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449, 1451-53; Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. 
Supp. 759, 763-66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002).   
183 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449. 
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V. PRIOR WRITTEN AGREEMENTS: DOES THEIR EXISTENCE AUTOMATICALLY 
INVALIDATE A SUBSEQUENT CLICKWRAP CONTRACT?  
A. General Rules and the UCC: Determining Final Intent of the Parties is a Question of Fact  
 
If an executed agreement already exists, section 2-209 of the UCC requires an express 
acceptance of any proposed supplemental contract terms, and such express assent cannot be inferred 
merely from a party’s conduct.184 Between merchants, however, when specific terms are not 
expressed until after the contract is formed, UCC § 2-207 governs the interpretation of the contract, 
and such terms, to the extent they materially alter the parties' agreement, are not incorporated into 
the parties' final agreement.185 Determining which written document the parties actually intended to 
represent as their final integrated agreement is determined on a case-by-case basis.186 
Consequently, whether the parties intended a particular written document to be the final expression 
of their contract terms is a question of fact and, in determining such question, the courts may 
analyze the various circumstances surrounding the formation of such contract.187 
B.  The Importance of Explicit Terms in Invalidating Subsequent Clickwrap Agreements 
 
The query is whether clickwrap constitutes additional supplemental terms to a prior written 
agreement that must be expressly accepted by the parties; or whether, conversely, clickwrap terms 
can serve to fill the gaps in an existing contract, thereby allowing such terms to be incorporated into 
an existing agreement.   Two cases help answer these questions.    
 
1. Trumping Clickwrap with Unambiguous Agreements and Integration Clauses
In Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v Micro Data Base Systems, Inc., the parties entered into an 
agreement in 1991 that contained an integration clause explicitly precluding any modifications to the 
 
184 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 764; Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).   
185 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991).    
186 M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., 998 P.2d at 311. 
187 Id. 
Page 31 of 35 
contract without the written consent of the parties.188 The defendant, Micro Data Base Systems, Inc., 
claimed that the terms of its shrinkwrap license constituted necessary supplemental terms to the 1991 
agreement because such agreement did not contain certain specific provisions found in the 
shrinkwrap (i.e. a forum clause).  Additionally, the defendant asserted that Morgan Laboratories 
accepted the additional shrinkwrap terms through its course of conduct.  The court held, however, 
that a course of conduct does not replace a no-modification-unless-in-writing provision.189 Assent 
must be express and cannot be inferred merely from conduct.190 The court maintained that although 
shrinkwrap may be enforceable, it cannot trump explicit prior agreements when those agreements 
contain a valid integration clause.191 
2. Upholding Clickwrap: Filling the Void left by Ambiguous Terms and a Prior Course of Conduct
The case in M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., however, demonstrated 
that a prior course of conduct can indeed prove relevant when an existing agreement is void of 
critical terms, specifically an integration clause.192 In Mortenson Co., Inc., the plaintiff 
(“Mortenson”) issued a purchase order to Timberline Software Corp. (“Timberline”) for an upgrade 
of its existing software system.  Mortenson was a construction contractor that utilized Timberline’s 
bid analysis software when responding to construction bids.  Mortenson had utilized Timberline’s 
software for three years prior to initiating its purchase order to Timberline for an upgraded system.  
Mortenson subsequently brought suit against Timberline for breach of warranties and alleged that 
the upgraded software was defective.  Timberline moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
limitation for damages set forth in its clickwrap agreement barred Mortenson’s recovery.  
 
188 No. C96-3998 TEH, 1997 WL 258886, *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997).   
189 Id. at *3.   
190 Id. 
191 Id. at *4. 
192 998 P.2d at 313-14.   
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Mortenson countered that the purchase order consisted of the entire contract between the parties, 
and that it therefore never affirmatively agreed to Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.               
The court held that the purchase order was not an integrated contract and that the terms of 
the clickwrap agreement were enforceable against Mortenson.193 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court specifically pointed to the prior “course of dealing” between the parties.194 The court noted, 
for instance, that Mortenson had to explicitly assent to the software license by clicking “I agree” 
prior to accessing the software services and had completed such transactions on numerous occasions 
over the three years it had utilized Timberline’s software.195 Just as important, however, was the 
court’s determination that Mortenson’s purchase order failed as an integrated contract based on its 
absence of an integration clause and lack of certain explicit terms.196 The court pointed out that the 
purchase order set an hourly rate for software support but it failed to specify how many hours of 
support were included.197 Similarly, the purchase order established that the software would be 
updated, but the pricing for such upgrades was to be determined at a later point in time.198 
Moreover, the court asserted that the presence of an integration clause in a contract provides strong 
support to an argument that the parties intended such contract to be fully integrated.199 
Accordingly, the court found that because no such clause was contained in Mortenson’s purchase 
order, and because the contract was lacking in certain critical terms, the logical conclusion was that 
the contract was not intended as the complete and final agreement between the parties.200 The court 
determined, therefore, that the existence of the prior purchase order did not invalidate the 
subsequent clickwrap terms.  In fact, the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement, according to 
 
193 Id. at 307.   
194 Id. at 313-14.    
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 311.    
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
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the court, served to fill the gaps present in Mortenson’s purchase order.201 Consequently, the court 
held that when Mortenson clicked “I agree” and began utilizing the software, Mortenson explicitly 
assented to the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.202 
C. Notes of Caution while Reinforcing the Validity of Clickwrap 
 
Considering the holdings in Mortenson Co., Inc.203 and Morgan Laboratories, Inc.,204 a 
word of warning is appropriate.  When the possibility for a subsequent clickwrap contract is present, 
counsel, contract officers, and purchasing officials must all be aware of the impact their contract 
formation, and specifically their contract provisions, may have on the enforceability of the 
clickwrap agreement.   In fact, it seems advisable in such circumstances to specifically reject a 
party’s clickwrap agreement within the integration clause of a contract.    
Nonetheless, the holdings above reinforce the validity of clickwrap as a method of 
contracting.  If the enforceability of clickwrap terms can even be questioned, much less upheld, 
when a prior agreement exists, then it stands to reason that clickwrap can certainly be deemed 
enforceable under normal contractual circumstances.      
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
A preliminary review of clickwrap court decisions could lead one to assume that a great deal 
of uncertainty and discrepancy exits in this area of the law.  Upon further analysis, however, it 
becomes clear that such discrepancies are based more on interpretation of facts than differences in 
legal reasoning.  Although the final judgments of the various courts may seem disparate, the courts 
 
201 Id. at 310-11.   
202 Id. at 313-14; see also I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338-39 (D. Mass. 
2002)(holding that the existence of a prior purchase order did not invalidate a subsequent clickwrap agreement; 
clickwrap served to fill the gaps of any prior agreement and cickwrap can fill the gaps left behind by a prior contract.  
The court specifically noted that it would be absurd to let a purchase order with silent terms govern.). 
203 998 P.2d at 313-16. 
204 No. C96-3998 TEH, 1997 WL 258886, *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997).   
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have applied basic contract law in determining the enforceability of clickwrap agreements, and their 
legal reasoning has been consistent.205 
Basic contract law doctrines require a manifestation of agreement between the parties.206 
Such manifestation of assent cannot occur unless there exists a prior ability to review and reject the 
terms of the agreement.207 Additionally, a party must be given reasonable notice of such terms prior 
to securing the related products or services.208 In all the clickwrap cases reviewed above, the courts 
consistently applied these standard principles of contract law.  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit pointed out, “reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and 
unambiguous assent to those terms” are essential to maintain the integrity of electronic 
transactions.209 
Similarly, courts have applied basic contract law in approaching questions of “adhesion” 
inherent in clickwrap agreements.  To hold a contract of adhesion unenforceable, it must be shown 
that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.210 Again, courts have 
been consistent in their application of this doctrine when reviewing clickwrap disputes.  Although a 
clickwrap agreement (in the absence of reasonable competition) may meet the criteria of procedural 
unconscionability, a showing of substantive unconscionability is still required to find the agreement 
unenforceable.211 As a result, courts have found clickwrap agreements unenforceable on this basis 
in only a limited number of circumstances.212 
205 Condon, supra note 5, at 454; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 495.    
206 Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 133 (1879); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 31 (2d 
Cir. 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981). 
207 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 
(D. Kan. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d  305, 312-13 (Wash. 2000). 
208 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 429-31 (2d. Cir. 2004). 
209 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
210 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 
569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).   
211 Id. 
212 M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., 998 P.2d at 316; see Condon, supra note 5, at 455.  
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Unless a clickwrap agreement is specifically precluded by the existence of a previous 
contract, the clickwrap agreement will be upheld if its terms are not found unconscionable and the 
agreement is otherwise compliant with standard contractual requirements.  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit explicitly phrased it, a clickwrap agreement will be held “enforceable unless 
[its] terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”213 In other words, 
counsel, purchasers, and contract officers should be aware that objections to clickwrap are no 
different than objections to any other forms of contracting.  In establishing this principle, the courts 
have been clear and their legal reasoning consistent.    
213 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449.  
